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NOTES
Constitutional Law - Procedural Limitations on Defenses
Available in Contempt Proceedings
Proponents of integration focus upon the use of well-publicized acts of
civil disobedience as a tool to achieve racial, social and economic equality
for the Negro. This tool is utilized by small groups of demonstrators or
picketers and in large mass demonstrations, parades and marches on the
"seats of government." Precise timing is essential. With the goal of drama-
tization of their cause, civil rights leaders build sympathy and support to
a climactic stage. But, as the climax is about to be reached, the leaders find
themselves facing a revitalized tool of the past, the ex parte temporary re-
straining order or injunction. The injunction is obtained by the local offi-
cials, based usually on the pretext of public safety; but its real purpose is
often just to disrupt the movement by temporarily halting the activity. At
this time the leaders have to make a difficult choice. If the activity ceases
and the injunction is fought in the courts, there will be a period when the
emotions and sympathy that have been generated can cool off; but if the
activity is continued and the injunction temporarily ignored, constitutional
grounds for its violation may be advanced at a later time.
I. THE DEVELOPING ROLE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
RIGHT OF FREE SPEECH
The protection of the constitutionally guaranteed right of expression has
undergone, and is undergoing, constant change. Inherent in this change is
the conflict between expanding the constitutional protection and determin-
ing where, in light of current societal mores, the line is to be drawn for the
greater benefit of society. In dealing with the right of free speech, the
courts and legislatures, after recognizing that the right was not "absolute,'
attempted to delineate its boundaries. In Schenck v. United States' the
Supreme Court enunciated its first' major test for determining whether
particular speech was to be afforded the protection of the Constitution,
the "clear and present danger" rule.4 The clear and present danger doctrine
was temporarily replaced as the rationale of a majority of the Supreme
Court by the "dangerous tendency" doctrine.' This test attempted to
weigh the probable effect of speech or expression on other social values. As
'Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666-68 (1925); Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273
(1915) (speech is not protected if it is to encourage a man to commit a crime); Robertson v.
Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897).
2249 U.S. 47 (1919).
a The Court adopted the common law rule of proximate causation which required proof of the
speaker's unlawful intent through a showing of a direct and immediate relation between a spoken
word and an illicit act.
' "The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and
are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the sub-
stantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
'Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 249 (1920). See also Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652 (1925); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
a guideline for determining boundaries of free speech, the dangerous ten-
dency test offered no real protection to speech. If there was a conflict be-
tween the speech and other social values, the speech would be prohibited
This was far too restrictive on the constitutional right of speech and so the
clear and present danger test was "re-adopted." A state was allowed to
prohibit speech only when that speech overstepped the "danger" boun-
dary. Moreover, as a practical tool, the test was vague and hard to apply
in everyday situations.8 The difficulty facing the courts was that the test
did not recognize "shades" of "evil,"' nor was the "present" requirement
a very realistic one."
The clear and present danger doctrine also left unanswered the problem
resulting when there was a conflict between freedom of speech and another
constitutionally guaranteed right. As a result of this conflict the Court
adopted the "ad hoc balancing" test," which provided that in each case the
Court was to balance the individual's interest of free expression with the
social interest sought by the regulation restricting that expression. This
test, while purporting to give full weight to values of free speech, has been
criticized as being too broad and lacking clearly defined standards to guide
a court in its decision-making. The doctrine has also been criticized be-
cause if applied seriously, the factual determinations involved would be
enormously difficult and time-consuming.1 Another attempt at delineating
a workable test for determining the boundary of free speech occurred
when the Supreme Court adopted the test of "whether the gravity of the
'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech
as is necessary to avoid the danger."" This test, while balancing the evil
against its improbability, has not been satisfactory as a workable rule of
law, and currently the Supreme Court is deciding cases on a case-by-case
approach using any one of these tests to fit the facts, but usually using a
"balancing" test of some kind whereby it decides whether the speech is to
be prohibited in favor of some other social value. 4
II. PICKETING AS AN EXPRESSION OF SPEECH
One particular way in which speech has conflicted with other rights has
been in the area of picketing. Picketing as an expression of speech has never
been recognized as an absolute constitutional right," nor has it been placed
6 Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 910 (1963).
7Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937).
'The doctrine applied mainly where the restrictions at issue were direct prohibitions of expres-
sion by criminal sanction. Emerson, supra note 6, at 911.
' If the speech proposed the crime of jay-walking, it could be curtailed just as legally as if the
words proposed murder.
" If the evil was in fact a "substantive evil," what difference would it matter whether the evil
was to occur in one day, three weeks or five years?
" American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
"Emerson, supra note 6, at 912-14. See also Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959)
for summary of factors which would have to be balanced.
"3Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951).
14Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961) (external security
vs. free speech); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity vs. free speech); Feiner
v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951) (internal order vs. free speech).
"Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (Justice Black's concurrence indicates that there is
no constitutional right to picket, only a right insofar as it is an expression of speech which is con-
stitutionally protected. Id. at 578); Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1949) (picketing is
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beyond the control of a state if the manner in which it is conducted or the
purpose which it seeks to effectuate gives adequate grounds for its disal-
lowance. " The early cases that upheld picketing as an expression of speech"
followed the clear and present danger rule"s and pointed out the necessity
that the picketing be "peaceful"1 and as long as the picketing was not
violent, it could not be enjoined merely because it provoked violence in
others.'
As an extension of the picketing freedom, parades, demonstrations, and
marches have come into vogue as the way to express one's self. But parades
are often restricted by local permit systems or ordinances which are issued
by local city officials. A permit system for parades or processions is not a
denial of free expression as long as the control exercised is not so stringent
as to abridge speech or communication of thought as has been associated
in public places. 1 If the ordinance subjects speech to license and censorship,
such ordinance is invalid." In 1951, the Court extended the doctrine of
"prior restraint" to the area of free speech. The Court held that an ordi-
nance which vested discretionary power in an administrative official to
grant or deny a permit to speak on public streets was a prior restraint on
not the equivalent of speech as a matter of fact).
"SHughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 465 (1949). See also Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
559 (1965); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Kelly v. Page, 335 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1964)
where the court stated:
Peaceful picketing for the object of eliminating racial discrimination in department
stores open to the general public is a right embraced in free speech under the First
Amendment of the Constitution, and made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth
Amendment. . . .And these rights to picket and to march and to assemble are not
to be abridged by arrest or other interference so long as asserted within the limits of
not unreasonably interfering with the right of others to use the sidewalks and streets,
to have access to store entrances, and where conducted in such manner as not to
deprive the public of police and fire protection.
Id. at 119 (citations omitted).
17 Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) held that the rights of speech and of assembly through
picketing were also protected against infringement by state action by the provisions of the four-
teenth amendment relating to the due process and privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States. See also Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
" In Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), the Supreme Court, in holding that a state
statute which prohibited picketing was invalid, declared that:
The power and the duty of the State to take adequate steps to preserve the peace and
to protect the privacy, the lives, and property of its residents cannot be doubted.
But no clear and present danger of destruction of life or property, or invasion of the
right of privacy, or breach of the peace can be thought to be inherent in the activi-
ties of every person who approaches the premises of an employer and publicizes the
facts of a labor dispute involving the latter.
Id. at 105.
"
9 Id. See also Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106 (1940).
0 Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
"Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941). See also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 306-07 (1940); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S.
444, 451 (1938). In Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939) the Court stated that:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held
in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes
of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public ques-
tions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part
of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. The privilege of a citizen
of the United States to use the streets and parks for communication of views on
national questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but rela-
tive, and must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience,
and in consonance with peace and good order; but it must not, in the guise of reg-
lation, be abridged or denied. (Emphasis added).2 Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938).
the exercise of first amendment rights and clearly invalid in the absence
of appropriate standards to guide the official's action." Staub v. City of
Baxley' went one step further in holding that "failure to apply for a li-
cense under an ordinance which on its face violates the Constitution does
not preclude review . . . of a judgment of conviction under such an ordi-
nance. . . . 'The Constitution can hardly be thought to deny to one sub-
jected to the restraints of such an ordinance the right to attack its constitu-
tionality because he has not yielded to its demands.' "'
III. WALKER V. CITY OF BIRMINGHAM"
Eight leaders of national and local civil rights groups made plans to
stage mass parades on Good Friday and Easter Sunday of April 1963 in
Birmingham, Alabama. Two prior attempts had been made to comply
with a vague city ordinance that required parade permits, 7 but these re-
quests were refused with no clear reason given for the refusal. When the
city officials learned of the definiteness of the parades, they filed a petition
in the state circuit court asking for an ex parte temporary restraining order
to prohibit the leaders from participating in an unlawful parade without
a permit. The city alleged that such conduct would provoke breaches of
the peace and place a strain on the police department. The injunction was
issued"8 and these eight leaders were served. At a press conference the next
day, they stated that they intended to disobey the injunction."9
On Good Friday and Easter Sunday the marches took place as planned.
The actual marchers were very orderly, stayed on the sidewalks, stayed off
private property, stopped at traffic lights and obeyed safety laws of the
city. The crowd that followed was not as well-controlled or law-abiding.
On the Sunday march, violence occurred between the followers and on-
lookers, both white and Negro. People were injured, property destroyed
and most of the leaders were arrested.
On Monday, the city officials went to the circuit court for an order to
show cause why the leaders of the march should not be held in contempt
for violating the injunction. An attempt was made to raise the constitu-
tional issues that the injunction was vague, overbroad, and restrained free
speech, and also that the ordinance behind the injunction was unconstitu-
tional on its face because it could be, and actually had been, administered
in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner. The court refused to hear the
constitutional issues because there had been no attempt to comply with the
injunction or an attempt to get a permit after its issuance. The only issues
2 2 Kunz v. United States, 340 U.S. 290 (1951). In the dissent to this case, Justice Jackson at-
tempted to show how the clear and present danger doctrine enunciated by Justice Holmes was ig-
nored. He states: "In this case the Court does not justify, excuse, or deny the inciting and provoca-
tive character of the language, and it does not, and on this record could not, deny that when
Kunz speaks he poses a 'clear and present' danger to peace and order." Id. at 302.
24355 U.S. 313 (1958).2
-1d. at 319.
26388 U.S. 307 (1967).
2 7
BIRMINGHAM, ALA., GENERAL CODE § 1159 (1944).
2' Appendix "A" of Supreme Court opinion. 388 U.S. at 321.
"Appendix "B" of Supreme Court opinion. Id. at 323.
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the court would decide were whether there was jurisdiction to issue the in-
junction and, if so, whether it had knowingly been violated. The court
found the leaders guilty of contempt. The Supreme Court of Alabama
summarily affirmed the circuit court and also refused to hear the constitu-
tional issues raised, stating that these issues should have been raised in a
motion to dissolve or discharge the injunction prior to violating it.'
The Supreme Court of the United States, in a five-to-four decision, a
affirmed the Alabama Supreme Court's opinion. The Court relied on the
doctrine enunciated in Howat v. Kansas"' that if a court has jurisdiction to
issue an injunction, the only way that the injunction can be attacked is
directly in the court of original jurisdiction and then by appeal from that
decision, but not by proceedings in a collateral action. The injunction was
to be obeyed, however erroneous that action of the court may have been,
and disobedience constituted contempt of court."a Rigid enforcement of
this rule is a means by which the judiciary can command respect for their
position. The Court indicated," however, that if any step had been taken
to show respect for the Alabama judicial process by complying with the
injunction, the constitutional issues could have been raised and would
probably have been decided in petitioners' favor in the Supreme Court.
When the first amendment right of free speech and other social values
have collided, the judiciary has often undertaken a "balancing" of these
interests."a In Walker the interest of the state of Alabama in having its
court orders enforced collided with the right of free speech."6 The Supreme
Court has decided that the preservation of respect for the judiciary out-
weighs the constitutionally guaranteed right of free speech. The cases that
the Court relied on, Howat v. Kansas"7 and United States v. United Mine
Workers of America, a must be read in light of their particular facts. These
cases involved the use of the injunctive power by the courts, forty years
before Walker, to preserve already existing conditions in the labor field
when it was reasonably necessary to enable the administrative tribunal
(Howat) or the court (United Mine Workers) to decide an underlying
controversy. In re Green,"5 relied on by both the majority and dissents,
seems to have qualified the broad language of Howat. In Green the Su-
preme Court said: "Even if we assume that an ex parte order could prop-
erly issue as a matter of state law, it violates the due process requirements
of the Fourteenth Amendment to convict a person of a contempt of this
nature without a hearing and an opportunity to establish that the state
court was acting in a field reserved exclusively by Congress for the federal
"°Walker v. City of Birmingham, 279 Ala. 53, 181 So. 2d 493 (1965).
"1 Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
a2 258 U.S. 181 (1922). See United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258
(1947).
as 258 U.S. at 189-90.
' E.g., "The generality of the language contained in the Birmingham parade ordinance upon
which the injunction was based would unquestionably raise substantial constitutional issues con-
cerning some of its provisions." 388 U.S. at 316. See note 56 infra.
35See notes 8-21 supra, and accompanying text.
as 388 U.S. at 344 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
8'25 8 U.S. 181 (1922).
3'330 U.S. 258 (1947).
39 369 U.S. 689 (1962).
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agency."'  If the injunction can be challenged without prior attempts to
obey it on the basis that the underlying issue is arguably subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board, certainly the
injunction can be challenged on the grounds that it violated the first
amendment of the Constitution.4'
As a method of safeguarding the right of free speech, the "prior re-
straint" rule' could have been applied in this case. In Thomas v. Collins,43
a case with facts similar to Walker, the Supreme Court did not consider
whether or not petitioner should be able to raise the constitutional issues
because he did not fight the ex parte restraining order: it reversed his con-
viction, holding that the statute on which the injunction was issued was a
prior restraint on his rights of free speech and assembly in violation of the
first and fourteenth amendments." The use of the ex parte restraining
order as a tool for placing prior restraints on the first amendment free-
doms was discussed in the dissents of Justices Warren and Brennan.' Chief
Justice Warren concluded: "Such injunctions, so long discredited as wea-
pons against concerted labor activities, have now been given new life by
this Court as weapons against the exercise of First Amendment freedoms.""
The Court could also have used an analogy to cases involving the use of
permit systems 7 to regulate parades and picketing. In Cox v. Louisiana"
the Court was faced with the facts similar to Walker: the picketers were
orderly and violence occurred between the onlookers and the followers
initially. " The Court looked at the permit statute and said: "The statute
itself provides no standards for the determination of local officials as to
which assemblies to permit or which to prohibit. Nor are there any ad-
ministrative regulations on this subject. . . .From all the evidence ...it
40 Id. at 692-93.
" Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 332 (1967) (Warren, C.J., dissenting). See
also Justice Brennan's dissent, id. at 347.
42 See note 23 supra.
43323 U.S. 516 (1945). This case involved a Texas statute that required a person to obtain
a soliciting card before he could talk with union members. An ex parte restraining order was issued
in anticipation of a speech Thomas was to give to a labor meeting. He ignored the order and gave
the speech. He was subsequently charged with and convicted of contempt. In a more recent case,
Congress of Racial Equality v. Douglas, 318 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1963), it was held that an injunc-
tion which prohibited the exercise of a constitutionally guaranteed right is a prior restraint. "These
fundamental rights to speak, assemble, seek redress of grievances and demonstrate peacefully in pur-
suance thereto cannot be abridged merely because a riot might be threatened to be staged or that
the police officers are afraid that breaches of the peace will occur if these rights are exercised."
318 F.2d at 102. See also Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963), where a person was convicted
of contempt when he did not obey a state judge's order to get into his own segregated section.
The Supreme Court said that: "State-compelled segregation in a court of justice is a manifest viola-
tion of the State's duty to deny no one the equal protection of its laws. Id. at 62.
4 323 U.S. at 540.
4' 388 U.S. at 330-32, 346-49. Justices Warren and Brennan also agreed on another point of
dissension: that this holding of the Supreme Court completely ignored the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution by giving the desire for respect of a state judicial system superiority over the First
Amendment right of free expression. Id. at 317, 338.
4"Id. at 331.
47 See note 21 supra.
48 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
" In this case, as well as Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963), the Court stated
that petitioners were arrested because they expressed views contrary to those of the city officials
and the white onlookers and held that until a breach of the peace had in fact taken place, a re-
straint on expression infringed on petitioners' "constitutionally protected rights of free speech,
free assembly and freedom to petition for redress of their grievances." 372 U.S. at 235, referred to
at 379 U.S. at 551.
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appears that the authorities . . . permit or prohibit parades or street meet-
ings in their complete uncontrolled discretion."5  While stating that those
who communicate ideas by conduct rather than pure speech are not af-
forded the same kind of freedom under the first and fourteenth amend-
ments,"M the Court concluded that if it was the practice to allow unfettered
discretion in local officials to regulate the use of the streets for peaceful
parades and meetings, this was "an unwarranted abridgement of appel-
lant's freedom of speech and assembly secured to him by the First Amend-
ment, as applied to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment . . . ."" Even
if the Walker Court would not look at the constitutionality of the ordi-
nance itself,5 or at the arbitrary action of the non-judicial officials' action
involving attempts at obtaining the required permit," it could have looked
at the judge's action in granting the ex parte injunction as a judicial ex-
tension of the "unfettered discretion" that the parade ordinance contained.
If the parade ordinance" was unconstitutional on its face," or patently
unconstitutional, it "is not made sacred by an unconstitutional injunction
that enforces it. It can and should be flouted in the manner of the ordi-
nance itself.""s Under the Staub rule," if the ordinance was invalid, peti-
tioners had the right to act first in violation of the injunction and later
challenge both the injunction and the ordinance in one proceeding.
IV. CONCLUSION
Walker v. City of Birmingham is difficult to justify in light of recent
cases which have recognized the right of speech and expression in a chang-
ing American society. Two possible reasons can be given for the decision.
First, as a reaction to civil rights extremism and the violence and lawless-
ness that has accompanied some demonstrations, the Court felt that this is
the time and place to "clamp down" on demonstrations and protestors.
Second, and more likely, the Court felt that the result of allowing consti-
tutional defenses to be raised at a contempt proceeding would deprive
courts with injunctive power of their most valuable weapon, the auto-
matic contempt conviction. If this was the reasoning of the Court, the
rationale it used is outdated and defective. Under a strict interpretation of
the facts, this case could have been decided on a "police-power" argument.
But instead, the Court has given a decision based on a strict procedural
rule and as a result has left one very important question unanswered: How
much respect must be given to state courts in circumstances like this? If
any respect, however minute, is all that is required, it seems an idle re-
quirement.
50379 U.S. at 556-57.
5 1 1d. at 555.
52Id. at 5 58.
53 3 8 8 U.S. 307, 318 (1967).
54Id. at 317, note 9.
5 See note 27 supra.
" In a subsequent case involving the same march in Birmingham, an Alabama appellate court
held that the Birmingham parade ordinance which was the basis for the injunction was uncon-
stitutional on its face as a repression of free speech. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 43 Ala.
App. 68, 180 So. 2d 114 (1964).
57 388 U.S. at 338 (Brennan, J., dissenting.).
s See note 24 supra, and accompanying text.
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In Walker, had the action been taken by the city officials themselves in
refusing the permit in an arbitrary or capricious manner, petitioners would
have been allowed to ignore the lack of permit, to march, and to fight the
ordinance as unconstitutional. And, they probably would have successfully
defended their actions even before this very Court. The burden on the con-
stitutional rights of free speech and free assembly are the same whether
placed there by local officials administering an unconstitutional permit
system or by a state court requiring applicants to spend months or years
contesting an injunction in the courts in order to win a right which the
Constitution says no government shall deny. 9
Wayne L. Friesner
The Constitutionality of Welfare Residence Requirements
Green, his wife and their eight minor children moved to Delaware to
establish residence. After two unproductive periods of employment Green
and his wife applied for and were granted welfare.' Subsequently the as-
sistance was disallowed when it was discovered that they had not resided in
Delaware for one full year prior to applying for welfare.! The Greens then
initiated a class action for a declaratory judgment against the Delaware
Department of Public Welfare, claiming that the residence requirement
violated the United States Constitution. Held: A statute which requires an
individual to reside within a state for one year before becoming eligible for
state welfare benefits creates an invidious discrimination against a class of
needy persons who have otherwise satisfied welfare requirements and there-
fore violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to
the United States Constitution. Green v. Department of Public Welfare,
270 F. Supp. 173 (D. Del. 1967).
I. RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL CONCEPTS
Durational residence as a prerequisite to receiving welfare benefits orig-
inated with the English Poor Laws4 and is predicated upon the traditional
concept of settlement.' The basis of this concept is that an individual's be-
longing to a community obligated the community to support him in time
of need. Today the various states have applied this rationale to welfare
5 Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 424 (1953) (Douglas, J., dissenting.).
'Green was employed successively by two contractors, but due to bad weather and lay-offs, he
averaged less than $40 per week net income.
'DEL. CODE ANN. ch. 31, § 504(4) (Supp. 1966) provides that assistance is available to needy
persons of Delaware who have resided therein for at least one year prior to the filing of their
application, except that the residence period does not apply to medical treatments.
'A three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1964).
'English Poor Laws, 47 ELIZ. c. 2 (1601).
'See Mandelker, The Settlement Requirement in General Assistance, 1955 WASH. U.L.Q. 355.
The 1601 English Poor Laws initiated a system of public tax supported relief and the establish-
ment of the alms house and the work house. The early concept conferred settlement through par-
ents, by birth or by a residence period in the community. The settlement doctrine was carried
over to the colonies in a strict form with common requirements for settlement remaining essen-
tially the same.
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